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The conventional wisdom says yes.  But close examination
suggests the answer is not nearly so clear-cut.
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This paper  -a  product of the Intemational Economic Analysis and Prospects Division, International
Economics Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to understand the linkages between the world
economy and the development process.  This paper was written as background to a larger report by the
International Economics Department entitled Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries..
Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact
Mila Divino, room S8-218, extension 33739 (33 pages, with figures and tables).
There is a conventional perception that high real  the view that the high interest rates that prevailed
interest rates are bad for economic growth.  during the 1980s were the result of increased
However, Shafik and Jalali show that close  profitability or improved investment efficiency.
examination of the experience over the last 40
years unde.  -ines  the existence of such a rela-  For the low- and middle-income countries,
tionship.  For much of the 1950-79 period, ex-  the relationship between interest rates and
post real interest rates were less than the growth  growth is ambiguous.  High real interest rates
rate of income in the major economies, whereas  will probably adversely af  fect developing
the 1980s were a period of rapid growth in the  countries that are highly indebted at variable
world economy that coincided with  interest rates and those that need to borrow
unprecedentedly high real interest rates.  further.  However, developing countries that are
outward-oriented may be able to profit from
Shafik and Jalali review the competing  increased exports as a result of rapid growth in
explanations for the high real interest rates of the  the industrial countries.
1980s. These explanations include the U.S.
budget deficit, restrictive monetary policies in  What does this analysis imply for the
the OECD, a decline in global savings, a boom in  consequences of high real interest rates in the
investment, and higher risk premia. The merits  future?  One implication is that high real interest
of each explanation are reviewed in light of the  rates may not matter for growth performance if
empirical evidence.  more productive investnment  results.  If there is a
negative impact of higher interest rates on
The authors stress that the critical question is  growth, it will probably affect developing
whether real interest rates have had an adverse  countlies more.  This is not simply because the
effect on economic growth, not why they have  low- and middle-income countries are net
been high in the recent past.  To test this, the  debtors; it seems also to reflect the differing
literature on cointegration is used to explore  structural characteristics of industrial and
whether world interest rates and growth rates  developing economies.  Further research might
equilibrate in the long run.  The econometric  consider the role of human capital and institu-
evidence disputes the view that high interest rates  tional constraints in determining the ambiguous
are associated with low economic growth in the  relationship between world interest rates and
industrial countrics. This would seem to support  growth in the developing countries.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
AffairsComplex. An objective ofthc scries is to get these findings out quickly, even ifpresentations arc Iess  than filly polished.
Thc findings, interpretationis,  and conclusions in thcse papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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1991..A  High RelInterest  Rajas Bad fox World Ecoomi  Growt
The perceived  existence  of a negative  relationship  between  interest  rates and growth is one
that pervades  much of economic  thinking. However,  the evolution  of the world economy  over the
past forty years  has apparently  defied  the exisftce of such  a relationship.  For much  of the 1950-79
period,  ex-post  real interest  rates were  less  than the growth  rate of income  in the major economies,
as shown  in table 1. In contast, the latter  half of the 1980s  were  a period  of relatively  rapid growth
in the industrial  countries  which  coincided  with unproceendy high rea  interest  rates.
An alternative  view is that high interesc  rates are associated  with periods of rapid growth
because  of improved  resource  allocation  and increased  productivity. Thus high real interest  rates
may be a  reflection of  growing investent  opportunities  and ilncasing  returs  because of
etnaties  and therefore  are consistent  with rapid growth? 2 O  t  other hand, these  increasing
returns seem  to be largely  in the OECD  and in some  of the newly  industializing  countries  whe  the
stock of human  capital is greater and the institutional  stcture  faciitates tological  change.
i This  i  the reason  why  authors  such  as McKinnon  (1973)  and Shaw  (1973)  have  advocated  financial
hberalization  and higher  real  interest  rates  in developig  countries.  However,  they  alsn  arguo  that the  level
of investm  will  be higher  with  icas  in real  interest  rates  because  of the  elimination  of  credit  rationing
as a reult of greater  savings  mobiliztion. For cross-country  evidnce  on the  gdationship  between  interest
naes and  growth  in developing  countries,  see  Gelb  (1989).
2This  would  be consitent  with  the new  growth  literture which  finds  incras  returns  to investment.
See  Romer  (1986,  Lucas  (1988),  and  Scott  (1989).3
TABLE  1: LONC-TERM  DEFL.TED  INTEREST  RATESC)  AND  INCOME  GROWTH  RATES  IN  0-7  COUNTRIES
............................................................................................
YEAR  1951-54 1955-59 1960*73  1974-79  1980-84  1985-89
...............................................................  ...................................................................................... 
USA
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  4.2  2.9  3.8  2.5  2.0  3.5
INFLATION  RATE  2.4  3.0  3.6  8.0  6.6  3.2
INTEREST  RATE  2.0  3.3  5.1  7.8  12.3  8.2
DEFLATED  INTEREST  RATE  -0.3  0.3  1.5  0.2  5.3  4.9
JAPAN  66-73  8S-88
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  NA  7.6  S.4  3.6  3.9  4.4
INFLATION  RATE  NA  2.8  5.9  8.2  2.2  0.9
INTEREST  RATE  %A  NA  6.3  8.0  8.0  4.9
DEFLATED  INTEREST  RATE  WA  NA  0.4  0.1  5.7  4.0
GERMANY  61-73
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  NA  NA  4.4  2.4  1.1  2.7
INFLATION  RATE  NA  NA  4.4  4.8  3.7  2.2
INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  7.2  7.7  8.7  6.4
DEF.ATED  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  2.7  2.8  4.8  4.1
UK  85-87
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  2.9  2.3  3.3  1.5  0.8  3.0
INFLATION  RATE  5.3  3.9  4.8  16.1  9.7  3.1
INTEREST  RATE  3.8  5.1  7.4  13.6  12.6  7.5
DErLATED  INTEREST  RATE  -1.3  1.2  2.5  *1.9  2.9  4.2
FRANCE
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  4.1  5.4  5.7  3.0  1.5  2.8
INFLATION  RATE  8.2  5.1  4.9  10.7  11.3  4.0
INTEREST  RATE  5.7  5.5  6.2  9.5  14.1  9.3
DEFLATED  INTEREST  RATE  -1.9  0.5  1.3  *1.0  3.5  S.1
ITALY  61-73
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  NA  MA  5.3  3.7  1.9  3.1
INFLATION  RATE  NA  NA  6.1  17.1  16.4  7.0
INTEREST  RATE  6.0  6.4  7.0  12.8  18.1  10.8
DEFLATED  INTEREST  RATE  NA  NA  0.9  -3.6  1.5  3.6
CANADA  85-88
REAL  INCOME  GROWTH  RATE  4.5  5.3  5.3  4.0  2.2  4.3
INFLATION  RATE  4.3  2.0  3.7  9.2  7.6  3.4
INTEREST  RATE  3.0  3.9  5.6  8.6  12.9  9.7
DEFLATED  INTEREST  RATE  -1.1  1.9  1.9  -0.5  4.9  6.1
NOTE: PERIOD  RATES  ARE  SIMPLE  CARITHMETIC)  AVERAGES  OVER  THE  PERIOD.
SOUJRCE:  IFS. INTEREST  RATES  REFER  TO  THE  FOLLOWING  LINES  OF  THE  IFS:
USA:  LINE  61A  (3  YR  GOVT.  BOMD  YIELD);  JAPAN:  61  (GOVT.  OND YIELD);
GERMANY:  61  (PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES  BOND  YIELD);  UK:  61  (LONG  TERM  GOVT.  BOND  YIELD);
FRANCE:  61  ("MOYMENS"  GOVT.  BOND  YIELD);  ITALY:  61  (GOVT.  BOND  YIELD);  AND
CANADA:  61A  t3-5  YR  GOVT.  BOND  YIELD)
(*):  "DEFLATED  INTEREST  RATES"  REFER  TO  EX-POST  INTEREST  RATES  WHICH  HAVE  BEEN  DEFLATED  BY
ACTUAL  INFLATION  RATES.  THIS  IS  DISTINCT  FROM  "REAL  INTEREST  RATES"  REFERRED  TO  IN
THE  TEXT  WHICH  USE  EX-POST  FUTURE  INFLATION  RATES  AS  THE  DEFLATOR  BASED  ON  THE
ASSUMPTION  OF  PERFECT  FORESIGHT.4
bhus%  there may be a diffent  rlationship between  growth an  e  inx.t  ates In industi  and
deeopig  countries.  This may be a ptal  eanatdon  for the d-liinking! of OECID  gr'wth from
developing  counut, growth obserd  in the world economy  during the 1980s.
Ihbis  paper briefly urveys  some  of the competng explanations  about the levI of real world
intest  rates  Both the 1ndustial  countri  and the developing  countrios  are considered  as well  as
the United  States  on its own  since  reatio  sze gives  it a greatr  weight  in determinng  world  market
outcomes. Ihereaftr,  an empirical  analysis  i  conducted  to test whethr  real interest rates and
growth rates equilibrate  in the long run for both the industrial  and developing  countries  using the
recent  rter e on cointegration.  This  wi  shed  sorm lght or the queston of whether  concem  over
the pereived high real rates of interest  is juwfied and give some,  indication  as to the differential
consequnces for indut  and developing  countries.
2.Exlnations  for High  Real Interest  Rate in fth 1290s
Ihe  high real rates of interest that prevafled  in the 1980s  have  been -ittnbuted  to the U.S.
budget  deficit,  restrictve monetary  policies  in the OECD, a decine in global  savings,  a boom in
invemt,  and higher risk premia. Ihese compeig  explanations  will  be surveyed  below.
2.1 United StatsBudg  Deficit
The U.S.  fiscal  deficit  was  a plausible  contributing  factor  to the high  interest  rates  of the  early
1980s.  Conventionally,  it was argued  that borrowing  by the U.S. on world  markets  drove  up interestiZqMs  at the expense  of developing  country  borrowers. However,  although  the U.S. budget deficit
remains  large, Its value as a share of GDP has fallen  from 6% in 1983  to 2.7%  in 1989. Table  2
shows  governmt  deficits  as a share  of GDP for the G-7 where  the same  pattem can be observd.
The fscl  deficit  as a share  of GDP for the G-? as a whole  has declined  from a high of 5.6%  in 1983
to 2.4%  in 1989,  the lowest  level  of the decade. Thus, further  explanations  are needed  to explain  the
persisnt  high real interest rates throughout  the 1980s.
Worries about the future financing  of the U.S. budget deficit  may be fueling  inftationary
expectations  and contributing  to higher nominal interest rates.  During the  1980s,  such fears
appareutly  were  not prevalent  as evidenced  by the behavior  of the US dollar. If agents  expected  that
U.S. deficits would be monetized  in the future, the dollar would have depreciated,  rather than
appreciate  as it did during  much of fte 1980s. 3 Therefore,  the empirical  evidence  does not support
a clear relationship  between  sizable  fiscal  deficits  and high interest rates. However,  the recent  real
depration  of the dollar combined  with the prolonged  deliberatons over the deficit  reduction
package  in the US Congress  may  have raised  inflationary  expectations.
2.2 Tight Mond=  PWicies  in th  OECD
Concern  about inflation  was a major factor influencing  monetary  policies  in the G-7. The
U.S. in paxticulau  adopted a restrictive monetary policy in 1981/82  and from 1987-89,  as evidenced
by table 3.  Figure 1 depicts  an index of money supply  in the G-7 where the slope of the curve
indicates  the rate of growth. Tight  monetary  policy  in the United  States  also forced  many European
3 Blanchard  and Summers  (1984).6
TABLE  2: CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  FINANCIAL  BALANCES  AS  X  OF GDP
................  ................................................  ...............................................................................................
YEAR  1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985  1986 1987 1988 1989
USA  -1.1  -2.3  -1.6  -1.2  -0.3 *3.4 -4.2 *2.7 -2.7 -1.5 -2.8 -2.6 -4.0 -6.0 -4.8 -5.3 -5.1 -3.3  *3.2  -2.7
JAPAN  *0.4  *0.2  -1.6  -1.6  -1.3  -4.8  -2.0  -6.2  -6.6  *5.4  -4.8  -4.5  -5.2  -4.9  *4.1  -3.7  -3.1  -1.9  -1.1  -0.8
ITALY  -5.1  -6.5  *7.5  -8.3  *7.3  -11.9  -8.5  -10.5  -13.5  -9.8  -9.5  *11.4  -13.4  -13.9  *13.2  -15.1  *12.3  -11.7  -11.6  -11.3
UK  1.8  -0.7  -2.7  -3.4  -4.6  -7.3  -5.7  -3.4  -5.2  -5.7  -4.7  -4.8  -3.4  -4.4  *3.2  *3.2  -1.9  -0.8  1.1  1.3
FRANCE 0.5  -0.4  0.7  0.4  0.4  *2.6  -1.0  -1.2  -1.4  -1.5  -0.1  -2.3  -3.4  -3.5  -2.7  -2.7  -3.3  -1.4  -2.2  -1.7
GERMANY  1.0  0.8  0.7  1.4  -0.7  -3.6  -2.8  -2.1  -2.1  -2.0  -1.8  -2.4  -2.0  -2.0  -1.8  -1.1  *0.9  -1.1  -1.5  -0.4
CANADA -1.1  -2.0  -1.6  -1.3  -1.3  *3.3  -3.2  *4.3  -4.9  -3.8  -3.5  -2.4  -5.6  -6.2  -6.5  -6.0  -4.0  -2.5  -2.9  -2.8
G-7  -0.7  -1.7  -1.5  -1.4  -1.2  -4.3  -3.7  -3.6  -4.1  -3.1  -3.4  -3.6  -4.6  -5.6  -4.7  -4.9  -4.3  -3.0  -2.7  -2.4
SOURCE:  GOP  AND  EXCHANGE  RATES  ARE  ALL  FROM  IFS. CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT'S  DEFICITS ARE  FROM  IFS EXCEPT  FOR  JAPAN  OV'R 1980-89;
UK OVER  1988-89;  AND  FRANCE  AND  GERMANY  IN  1989  THAT  ARE  FROM  OECO'S  ECONOMIC  OUTLOOK.
TABLE  3: MONETARY  EXPANSION  IN  G-7  COUFTRIES  (ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATE  OF  MONEY  SUPPLY,  IN  X POINTS)
.........................................................................................................................
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978  1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
.........................................................................................................................
USA  13.2  12.9  6.5  5.4  12.7  13.7  10.6  7.7  6.2  7.1  4.7  8.7  16.3  9.1  9.6  9.0  4.0  6.1  3.8
JAPAN  24.3  24.7  16.8  11.5  14.5  13.5  11.1  13.1  8.4  6.8  10.7  7.6  6.9  6.9  8.9  9.3  11.2  9.8  11.8
ITALY  17.2  19.0  23.1  14.5  23.6  20.6  21.7  22.8  20.7  12.7  9.9  18.3  12.2  12.3  11.1  9.6  8.6  8.8  11.5
UK  13.2  27.9  27.5  12.9  7.1  11.6  9.5  14.6  12.5  18.5  27.8  11.3  12.8  12.4  11.5  22.1  21.1  19.3  19.7
FRANCE 18.4 18.9 14.6 17.8 15.7 12.3 14.6 72.6  14.4  9.'  10.5  11.0  11.0  8.6  6.8  7.6  6.5  5.6  4.8
GERMANY  13.4 14.0  8.8  7.2  11.5  7.6  10.3 10.3  5.2  4.  u7  6.9  5.7  5.6  8.0  6.5  6.0  5.8  5.1
CANADA  9.1  15.0 20.6 19.2 15.4 19.2 14.0 16.9 17.7  9.5 22.4  5.0  -0.9  6.0  5.3  7.9  8.7  10.6 13.5
........................................................................ I.................................................
SOURCE-  INTERNATIONAL  FINACE  STATISTICS  (IFS),  IMF.
NOTE:  MONEY  SUPPLY  IS  DEFINED  AS  THE  SUM  OF  MONEY  (MI)  AND  WUASI-MONEY  (IFS  LINES  34  +  35).
UK'S  DEFINITION  OF MONEY  CHANGED  IN  1987  BUT  FOR  CONSISTENCY,  THE  OLD  DEFINITION  WAS  USED  FOR  1987  AND  1988.
COMPARABLE  DATA  WERE  NOT  AVAILABLE  FOR  1989;  WE  APPLIED  THE  GROWTH  RATE  ACCORDING  TO THE  NEW  DEFINITION.
FRENCH  DATA  REFLECT  INSTITUTIONAL  CHANGES  IN  DECEMBER  1977. DATA  FROM  1978  ARE  BASED  ON THE  NEU  REPORTING  SYSTEM.Figure  1:
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Although  tiht monetary  polices  can  maintain  short  run  interest  rates  above  thir equilibum
level,  in the  long  run money  Is  neutral  and should  have  no effect  . n rea rates. Econometi studies
of the  relationship  between  monetary  policy,  interest  rates  and  output  have  found  significant  effects
for periods  ranging  from two to throe  yeai.'  However,  the evidence  from stock  makets does not
support  te  view  that moneta  policy  is  responsible  for  high  real  interst rates  in the  recent  period.
Stock  market  prcies  have  risen  while  rates  of return  have  fallen  according  to figure  2 and  table  4, in
contrast  to what  would  be expected  when  tight  montary policies  are  the  cause  of lhigh  interest  rates.
2.3. Sholm  oflobal
There  is no doubt that saving  ates have  declined  in aUl  of the G07  economies,  which
constitato  approximately  55%  of global  savings.  Figure  3 shows  the sharp  drop  in savings  rates  in
the ESt half of the 1980s  and the partial  recovery  in the latter  half of the 19809.  The decline  in
household  savings  ratios  was  partly  offset  by a  se  in  buiess  savigs;  however,  goNernment  savings
declined  i  sveral czuntries.s  The aggegate  decline  in savings  was fueled  largely  by the United
States,  although  savings  ratr-4'  %]so  fell  in the United  Kingdom,  France,  Italy  and Canada. Savings
rates  fll by  more  than  invent  rates  in the  United  States,  the  United  Kigdom, France,  Italy  and
Canada  over  the 1970-1990  period.
4 Blanchard  and  Summers  (1984)  review  this  evidence.
Dean  (1990).9
FimLre  2
REAL  QUARTERLY  STOCK  PRICES
19824  TO  IO1 I1  (16-1.0)
a
2.S  ~~~~~~~JAPAN 2.5
....  ...-  ..
2  -; ...
1_..,-  A'.  ..........
..  <-v.  . - GERMA
0.  . ...  .....  ....
0
82  83  84  85  a  87  s8  89  90
$r=:  Sock pdckftm  DM;
GNPddatfm  IMP.
Table  4:
Stock  Yields  (  Y)  (Year end)
1980 1981  11982|198311984il935j1936  1987;1983!  239
(United  States)  |  4.9!  S. 8  5.  4.5S  4.7.  3.8  3.6  3. 8  3.7  3.3
United  Kingdom)  i  6.41  6.1.  5.5  45  1  4.5  4.4.  4.2  ;.6  5.0  : W.  Gennany)  , 7.  47  6.  3  4.9:  3.71  3.9  2.7.  2.7  4.5  3.6  '.Q France)  6.4,  8.6'  7.7;  4.7j  4.4  3. A  3  2.58  .7 lapan)  6 2. 0'  1.  I  1.  7  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.5  I), t Canada) : 3. 9  4.6:  3.9  3.2,  3.6  3.1  2.9  3.2  3. 4  3. I Holland)  ; 6.  8.  7.7,  7.4  5. 0  4.5  4.5  4. 7  5.6  4.6  n.  3
5Australia)  3.6  4.9  5.3  3  3.6  4. 8  4.0  3.4  4. 2  4. 9  o. 2 (Hong  Kong)  2.6:  3.8  7.7  5.8'  4. 7  3. 7  I  1  4.4  4_3  S.U
jWorld")  4.  o  4. 5  3.8  3.8  3.2  2.6  2.6  2.  4  _.2
Source:  "Manual  of  Securities  Statistics,  1990"
Nomura Securities  Co.,  Ltd.,  Tokyo,  JapanL
Figure  3:  10
NATIONAL  SAVING  AND  INVESTMkNT  RATES IN  G7 COUNTRIES,  1970-89
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The recovery  in savings  rates  that started  after 1985  can be attributed  largely  to Gemany and
especially  to Japan where  above average  savings  rates were achieved  in the latter half of the 1980s.
While current savings rates may appear low compared to the approximately  23% rates which
prevailkd  in 19734 and 1979,  they  have nearly  returned to the level  of 21%  in 1970. Nevertheless,
savings  rates in the 1980s  were  considerably  lower  than those which  prevailed  in the 1970s.
This decline  in savings  rates has been  attributed to demographic  and social  factors  and to
financial  market liberalization.  In the context  of a life cycle  model  of consumption,  demographic
.hifts can result in falling savings  rates which can bring about hier  rates of interest  Te
population  of the OECD is increasingly  elderly  while  that of the developing  world is increasingly
young,  both of which  are groups  that have  low savings  propensities.' Thus the shortage  of global
savings  reflects  this demographic  shift that has reduced  the relative  size of high-saving  middle  aged
types  in the world population. Table 5  shows  the increasing  old age dependency  ratio for selected
OECCD  economies. This has coincided  with a decline  in the young age dependency  ratio.  In
contrast,  in the low and mid4de  income  developing  countries,  approximately  36%/o  of the population
were belkw  15 years of age in 1988. Nevertheless,  the proportion of the population  under 15 and
above  65 in the low and middle  income  countries  has declined  from 45%  in 1960  to approximately
401%  in 1988.'
6 Lal and  van  Wijnbergen  (1986).  Bovenburg  and  Evans  (1989)  found  that  demographic  factors  weoe  the
most  important  in explaining  the  decline  in U.S.  savings
7 World Bk,  1990.12
Table  5:
DEMOGRAPHIC  AND SOCIAL FACTORS  INFLUENCING  HOUSEHOLD  SAVING
Old  age  Yon  eQ.  Parpatbin  Poptiltort  Patbication
_ac,  dadpm  rattr  > 65  growth  rate:  women
1962.1970
Unhtd  States  15.8  49.5  16.7  1.2  45.5
Japan  P.5  37.7  35.6  1.1  56.4
Gumay  18.9  35.0  12.4  0.6  48.5
Unitad  lKngdom  19.3  36.8  12.5  0.5  49.2
Canada  13.0  54.6  14.3  1.7
Austaia  13.6  47.4  12.1  1.9
Finbnd  12.7  41.2  &8  0.3  61.9
1971.1960
Unied  States  16.4  38.8  13.2  1.0  54.1
jan  11.8  35.4  28.0  1.2  53.5
Geman  22.6  32.5  (8  0.0  49.4
Fne  21.5  37.7  8.6  0.6  51.7
Undted  Kingdom  22A  38.3  8.6  0.1  55.0
Canada  13.4  40.3  9.4  1.2  50.5
Australr  13.9  42.4  8.9  1.3  49.3
Rnland  16.0  32.7  10.9  0.4  66.2
Nalherlnds  16.  38.8  4.2  0.8
Norway  22.7  38.7  15.5  0.4  58.9
Sweden  23.8  31.8  7.5  0.3  67.5
1981-1986
United  States  17.7  33.1  10.8  1.0  62.6
Japan  14.5  32.9  25.1  0.6  56.7
Germany  *  21.7  23.2  3.6  -0.2  50.2
France  20.2  33.0  3.6  0.4  54.7
Italy  19.1  27.3  5.8  0.3  40.4
United  Kingdom  23.1..  30.2  5.3  0.1  58.8
Canada  14.9  32.3  7.5  0.8  61.1
Austrai  15.3  3686  5.1  1.4  53.3
Finland  18.2  28.8  5.0  0.5  72.7
Netherands  17.6  30.1  1.8  0.5  40.0
Norway  24.2  32.4  12.8  0.3  66.5
Spain  18.3  37.4  4.9  0.5  32.8
Sweden  26.3  28.7  4.4  0.1  76.7
,1  Popu4ti s5  yews  and  over  u a per  eant  of the  wokr-a  popuation.
Po,eltin  unde  15  yws an  a  pr cant  of  the  workin-age  poplation.
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In addition,  financial  market  liberalizataon haa  the effect  of reducing  household  liquidity
constrints and incrasing household  debt/income  ratios. This has facilitated  consumer  borrowing
against  items  such as home  equity,  thereby  reducing  the need  for savig for major purchase.  This
phenomnenon  has been  particularly  important  in the United  States,  the United  Kingdom,  and Canada
and may become  increasingly  important  in Japan with the introduction  of more liberal financial
market  reglations.  Moreover,  tax policies  in many countries,  such as taxation of interest income
and preferential  treatment of owner-occupied  housing,  result in a bias against savings. Combined
with the easing of household  credit  constraints,  these tax policies  have  encouraged  growth  in debt-
financed  consumption.
2.4.  L
Instead  of being  constraied by the supply  of savings,  high interest  rates may be reflecting
increased  investment  demand as a result of rising profitability. Investment  rates have closely
followed  savings  rates in the 0-7 as a whole,  as evidenced  by figure  3, but investment  did exceed
savings  in the latter half of the 1980s.8  This was the result of higher  investment  rates in the United
States and, to a  lesser extent, in the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada.  Although
investment  rates also rose in Japan and Germany,  they  did not increase  by as much as their savings
rates.
Although  investment  rates  did exceod  saving3  rates  in the 1980s,  they  were  stll lower  than investnelt rates  in the
1970s.14
If high interest  rates are being  caused  by a decline  in world savings,  as opposed  to a rise in
investment  demand,  one would  expect  equity  prices  to fall. However,  stock  prices  rose  in real terms
throughout  the 1980s  in the majcr economies,  as evidenced  by figure  2. This implies  higher  expected
future profits, which  would  seem  to support the view  that interest  rates were driven by investment
demand. The only exception  to this is Japan where  the stock  market declined  sharply  in the third
quarter of 1989. Thus for the 1980s,  the evidence  seems  to point to an across the board rise in
profitability  in the G-7 that may have  contributed  to higher interest  rates as a result of investment
demand.
2.5.  Incras  Risk Premia
Another  view  is that while  the underlying  true rate of interest  has not changed,  higher  risk
premia have resulted in higher real interest rates.  These increased  risk premia have often been
attributed  to increased  volatility  in the world economy,  particularly  that associated  with exchange
rates. The difficulty  in assesming  this view  is in measuring  the risk premium. In order to evaluate
the evolution  of risk premia  it is necessary  to have estimates  of both expected  inflation  and of the
true cost of borrowing  that underlies  the nominal  interest  rate.
While  exchange  rates have certainly  been more volatile  during the 1980s,  other features  of
the world  economy,  such  as commodity  prices,  output growth,  world  trade, short term interest  rates
and inflation,  have been  considerably  less  volatile  compared  to the 1970s  (see  table 6). In addition,
forward markets for hedging  risk associated  with exchange  rates, as well as risk associated  with
interest  rates and commodity  prices,  evolved  considerably  during  the 1980s. The increased15
Table 6:
INSTAB[LITY  IN  TLE  WORLD ECONOMY,  1953-1987
(Percent  de.vi.ptio-  fromimeau  )
Global  Economic  Variables  1953-1962  1963-1972  1973-1980  1981-1987
Commodity  Prices  (S)
IMF'  Total  Index  5.06  4.44  12.58  7.40
IMF  Food Index  2.24  4.51  il.94  12.35
IMF  Agricultural  Raw
Materials  Index  3.38  3.40  21.28-  5.31
LMIF  Oil  Prices  11.27  11.06  38.22  19.42
IMF  Minerals  Index  3.42  6.39  14.64  7.47
IMF  Manufactured  Goods  3.54  8.26  20.14  7.43
Export  Unit  Value  Index
Gross  Domnestic  Product
Industrial  countries  7.96  10.42  5.88  5.74
Developing  countries  8.35  14.24  10.01  2.96
GDP  Deflator  (Wholesale  prices)
Industrial  countries  3.65  6.64  15.78  3.68
Developing  countries  18.65  21.52  44.77  57.19
World Trade (Export Value)
Industrial  countries  12.62  29.09  30.14  10.90
Developing  countries  11.77  21.70  32.28  6.51
Terms  of Trade
Industrial  countries  3.40  1.11  3.48  5.26
Developing  countries  5.64  2.03  8.77  7.33
Exchange  Rates  (Spot)
!-Deutsch  Mark  1.77  7.2)2  15.69  17.66
$-Yen  0.24  5.24  l3.46  21.17
$--Pound  3.98  7.08  9.44  13.22
Short-Term  Interest  Rates
New York  11.67  14.49  17.92  10.55
London  18.28  19.91  27.04  26.16
Ind,.istrial  Share  Prices
New York  23.00  21.33  25.46  30.74
London  5.10  10.97  9.03  20.97
Based on Annual  Data,  PDPI  =  1  2  Y - Y /Y)  x  l00?.
Souirce:  International  Monetary  Fund,  various  publications,  Washington,  DC;
and  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  various
publicntions,  Paris.
Labys  and  Maizels  (1990)16
availability  of such instruments  partially offset  the increases  in volatility  associated  with exchange
rate movements.
An extension  of this view is that high interest rates feed on themselves  since indebted
countries  have  greater difficulty  in servicing  their debt and therefore  become  less  creditworthy  and
subject  to higher risk premia. 9 Although  risk premia are probably  related  to debt stocks,  it seems
unlikely  that d4veloping  country  borrowers,  which  constitute  a small  share  of total borrowing  on the
world market, are the ones driving  up world inteiest  rates.  Moreover,  the observed  high interest
rates  apply  to both developing  and  industrial  country  borrowers,  although  many  developing  countries
pay relatively  higher  risk premia.
3.  Some  Empirical  Evidence
The first question  that must be addressed  empirically  is whether  high  real rates  of interest  are
inconsistent  with high rates of growth in the long run.  This will provide  an indication  of whether
high real interest  rates matter for growth  as well  as what might be the causes  of high interest  rates.
To address  this question,  the literature  on cointegration  testing,  which  provides  a statistical  test for
the existence  of a long run equilibrium  relationship,  will be used. Cointegration  testing does not
address  the issue  of the direction  of causality;  rather, if some  linear  combination  of two (or more)
9 Bismut  (1990).17
time series produces a "white noise" error, those series are said to be cointegrated, thereby implying
the existence of an equilibrium relationship.' 0
3.1. The Data
The interest rate used was an annualized 3 month US$ LIBOR.  In theory, long term interest
rates should matter for growth more than short term rates.  However, because of the difficulties  in
measuring medium and long term inflationary expectations, the empirical literature tends to focus
on short term rates.  Moreover, because agents can switch maturities relatively easily in financial
markets, the evolution of short term interest rates is probably an adequate indicator of longer term
rates.
Tfhe  use of LIBOR as a proxy for the world interest rate assumes that because of increased
financial market  integration, there  is  growing convergence of  global  capital  costs."  This  is
confirmed by a recent study by Kugler and  Neusser which analyzes the equality of ex post real
interest rates in a multivariate time series framework using cointegration testing.  Their results
indicate that, although real interest rates are not equalized in the short run, they do tend to converge
10  For a survey  of the literature,  see  a special  issue  of the  QfQriBuHetin of EconQmid  aStatistic  with
articles  by Hendry (1986),  Gmnger (1986),  Hall (1986),  Jenkinson  (1986);  as well as work by Dolado and
Jenkinson  (1987),  Engle  and Gwanger  (1987).
11  Tis  is abstracting  from movements  in exchange  rates. Frankel  (1989)  has shown that intemational
integration  of financial  markets  has all  but eliminated  covered  interest  rate differentials  for the  major  industrial
countries,  although  real and nominal  exchange  rate variability  remain.18
in the long  run.2 This implies that  governments have reduced autonomy in  setting domestic
interest rates and maintaining an independent monetary policy. Similarly, Barro and Sala i Martin
(1990) found that, for ten OECD countries, the expected real interest rate for each individual country
depends  primarily on  world  factors  rather  than  own-country factors,  further  confirming the
hypothesis of intemational financial market integration.1 3
In order to test the validity of the assumption of international financial market integration,
a separate analysis is conducted for the U.S. to determine whether the findings change substantially
when the relationship between interest rates and growth rates are analyzed within an  individual
country.  The interest rate used for the U.S. is that on three month Treasury bills and the growth
rate is that of real GNP.  The U.S. sample uses quarterly data for the 1957-90  period.
In  order  to measure real interest rates, it is necessary to  derive an  empirical proxy for
inflationary expectations.  A number of different techniques have been used in the literature."4 The
problem with choosing between the various estimated alternatives for expected inflation is that the
12 The countries  studied  were:  the United  States,  Japan, the United Kingdom,  the Federal  Republic  of
Germany,  France,  and Switzerland.  The authors  analyzed  the period  from 1978  to 1989  using  monthly  data
and a variety of lag lengths  to capture the short and long run.  The one exception  to real interest  rate
convergence  in the long run is Switzerland  where  the rate is consistently  lower  than in other countries. The
explanation  seems  to be the political  and economic  stability  of the Swiss  economy  as well  as the anonymity
associated  with intemational  capital  flows  to Switzerland.  Kugler and Neusser  (1990).
13 The only exceptions  were Japan and the United Kingdom  where own country variables  were  also
significant,  reflecing  some  degree  of isolation  from international  markets  over the 1959-88  period.
14The  types  of proxies  for inflationary  expectations  that have  been  used  are: a three  year  moving  average
of actual  rates,  inflation  forecasts  from  private  forecasting  companies,  and autoregressive  estimates  of expected
inflation.19
results vary considerably depending on the technique chosen.'5  Instead, the rational expectations
hypothesis will be used here oi  the assumption that  the difference between expected and  actual
inflation rates is a serially uncorrelated random error.  Therefore, realized inflation rates based on
one-quarter forward inflation of the GDP deflator were used to derive real rates of interest.
For the industrial countries, output growth was defined as the real growth rate of GDP in
the G-7.  16  The G-7 data  is quarterly for the period 1970-1990.  For the developing countries,
output growth is defined as the real growth in GDP of the low and middle income countries.  The
developing  country data are annual for the 1970-1989  period. The movement of real output growth
in the OECD  and  in the low and  middle income countries and ex post  real interest rates are
described in figure 4.
3.2.  Time Series Prope2ries:  Testing for Unit Roots
In order to  avoid spurious correlations associated with trended variables, the time seiU
properties of the data  must be analyzed.  The test statistics in table 7 provide measures of the
stationarity of the time series. Series that need to be differenced  once to achieve stationarity are said
l5 For example,  Blanchard  and Summers  use both DRI forecasts  and a rolling  autoregressive  forecasts
as proxies  for expected  inflation. Between  1980-83,  DRI's forecast  of Japanese  inflation  was 3.5%  whereas
their statistical  forecast  indicated  that inflation  would  fall by 0.5%. For the period 1978-84,  inflation  in the
United Kingdom  was forecast  to be 8.2%  by DRI while  the rolling  autoregression  forecast  was only 2.3%.
Blanchard  and Summers,  1984.
16  The G-7 consists  of Canada, France,  Germany,  Italy, Japan, the United  Kingdom,  and the United
States. These  seven  economies  together  constitute  approximately  two-thirds  of world  GDP.20
Figure  4:
REAL  INTEREST  RATE  VS.  REAL  GDP  GROWTH  RATE
IN  OECD  AND  LDC  COUNTRIES,  1971-1989
10  -
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Source:  IFS  and  World  Banlk's  Economic  and  Social  Database21
TABLE  7: TESTING  FOR  UNIT  ROOTS:  COINTEGRATING  RtGRESSION  DURBIN  WATSON  (CRDW)  TESTS,
DICKEY-FULLER  (DF)  AND  AUGMENTED  DICKEY-FULLER  TESTS  (ADF)
............................................................................................
REAL  G-7  ANNUAL  LOC  US  REAL  US
INTEREST  GROWTH REAL  INT  GROWTH  INTEREST  GROWTH
RATE  RATE  RATE  RATE  RATE  RATE
..............................  ................................................................................................
CROW
HO:IO0)  0.16  0.26  0.25  0.93  0.17  1.39
HO:I(1)  1.90  1.24  1.80  1.64  1.93  2.84
HO:1(2)  2.52  2.63  2.91  2.55  2.64  3.33
DICKEY-FULLER  (DF)
HO:I(1)  -1.11  -1.37  -0.29  -1.29  -1.70  -6.18
NO:lt2)  *8.22  -5.71  -3.26  .3.34  -10.83  -18.13
DF  &  CONSTANT
HO:I(1)  1.91  -2.25  -1.09  -2.52  -2.33  -8.89
HO:1(2)  -8.17  -5.67  -3.32  *3.26  -10.80  -18.05
DF  &  CONSTANT  &  TIME
HO:t1l)  -2.37  -2.23  -1.30  -2.39  -2.77  -9.02
HO:1(2)  -8.12  -5.63  -3.31  -2.90  -10.75  -17.99
AUGMENTED  DICKEY-FULLER  (ADF)
HO:IC1)  0.41  -2.30  -0.51  -1.18  -1.00  -2.91
HO:1(2)  -3.74  -4.42  -1.33  -2.81  -5.21  -8.03
ADF  &  CONSTANT
HO:1(1)  -1.14  -3.11  -1.24  -2.69  -1.62  -5.62
HO:1(2)  -3.76  -4.39  -1.42  -2.75  -5.21  -8.00
ADF  &  CONSTANT  & TIME
HO:11)  -1.40  -3.09  -1.91  .2.72  -2.05  -5.76
HO:I(2)  -3.74  -4.36  -1.46  -2.48  -5.19  -8.00
............................................................................................
CRITICAL  VALUES:  N=21:  CRDOW1.069;  N=51:  CRDWcO.493;  N=101:  CRDW&O.259.
N=25:  DF  a  2.61;  DF+C  a 3.20;  DF+C+T  a  2.85.
N50:  DF  - 2.56;  DF+C  a  3.14;  DF+C+T  a  2.81.
Nz1OO:  OF  a  2.54;  DF+C  a 3.11;  DF+C+T  a 2.79.
CRITICAL  VALUES  FOR  THE  OF  AND  ADF  TESTS  ARE  THE  SAME.
NOTE:  ADF  TEST FOR  THE  QUARTERLY  DATA  IS  BASED  ON  FOUR  LAGS  OF  THE  RIGHT  HAND  SIDE  VARIABLE
WHILE  THAT  FOR  THE  ANNUAL  DATA  INCLLDES  TWO  LAGS.22
to be I(1),  whereas  those that must be diffLeed  twie  are refeared  to as I(2).'7 Thc result  an
somewhat  mixed. Then  Cointegrating  Regression  Durbin  Watson  (CRDW)  statistc Indicates  that all
the serwi, except the U.S. real inters  rate, are 1(l).  The Dickey-Fuler (DF) and Augmented
Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  tests are senstive  to whether  a constant  and/or tim  trend  are included,  so they
are reported sepaately for each. The DF and ADF tests seem  to imply that the real interst rate,
and to a lesser extent the 0-7 and LDC growth rates, are I(2).  The weak  power of these tests
hasbeen  widely  acknowledged." 8 The subsequent  econometric  analysis  will be conductd for both
hypotheses of stationarity so that  the results are not contingent on the hypothesis about the time
seies properties  of the data.
3.3.  CIbjtn  -=
The cointegrating  vectors  for output and interest  rates are presented  m table 8.  Equations
1-6  are for the 0-7, equations  7-8 are for the low  and middle  income  countries,  and equations  9 and
10 are for the United  States. Each equation  is presented  for the hypothesis  that the series  are I(1)
and 1(2)  which  is reflected  in the degree  of differencing. Evidence  of cointegration  includes  an R2
that is close  to unity, significant  coefficients,  a significantly  non-zero  CRDW statistic  and significant
DF and ADF tests on the residuals  from the regression.
All  of the series  were  tested  to determine  whether  they  were  stationary  without  differenng,  but this
was  not found  to be the  case.
is See  Jenkinson  (1986).23
TABLE  Bo  COINTEGRTING  VECTOISFOR  THE  LOW  AND  MIDDLE-INCOM  COUNTRIES  kN  EWATIONS
7  MD 8,  AND  REAL  OUTPUT  GROWH  IN THE  US IN EQUATIONS  9 AND  10
..................................................................................................................................  I.............0
0-7 COUNtRIES  DEVELOPING  COTAltIES  UUITED  STATES
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
HOMl(1)  HO:I(2)  HOsI(1)  H01I(2)  1OMO(1) 10(2)  HOs:l0)  HO:I(2)  HO:I(10)  HO:(2)
LEVELS  DIF  LEVELS  DIF  LEVELS  DIP  LEVELS  DIF  LEVELS  DIPf
CONSTANT  3.22  -0.03  3.37  -0.07  3.39  -0.01  5.51  -0.12  0.84  0.00
(9.94)  (0.28)  (8.97)  (0.33)  (3.63)  (0.06)  (17.17)  (0.41)  (7.84)  (0.04)
REAL  INTEREST  RATE -0.04  0.22  0.23  0.23  -0.11  0.21  -0.22  -0.08  -0.05  0.05
(0.57)  (2.51)  (1.47)  (1.39)  (0.68)  (2.27)  (3.13)  (0.43)  (1.39)  CO.")
R SURED  0.69  0.08  0.71  0.05  0.71  0.12  0.97  0.03  0.37  0.00
CRDV  0.27  1.30  0.28  1.26  0.30  1.21  1.49  2.11  2.85  3.33
F  83.52  3.17  43.78  0.97  4.73  2.59  218.18  0.21  38.08  0.10
DF  -2.31  *5.95  -1.38  -3.78  -1.62  -4.42  -2.66  -3.10  -9.07  -17.90
ADF(  -3.17  *4.35  .2.59  -2.96  .2.04  .2.88  *3.23  *2.54  -5.58  -7.82
NUIBERS  IN PAIRENTHESES  ARE  T STATISTICS.24
Equation I is the regression  of the level  of G-7 output and interest  rates on the assumption
that the series are I(1). The insignificance  of the interest rate as well  as the poor cointegration
statisdcs  imply that there is no long run relationship,  espey  given  the fact that the "t" statistics
are biased upwards  because  of autocorrelation  of the residuals.
The interest  rate is significant  in equation  2, which  is in fir  differences,  but has a positive  sign.
In order to test the hypothesis  that the 1980s  represented  a stuctural break in terms of the
relationship  between  interest  rates and growth,  the sample  was split and the equations  .eestimated.
Equations  3 and 4 imply  that there was no evidence  of an equilibrium  relationship  during  the 1970s
either. Similarly  during the 1980s,  real interest  rates did not have  a negative  effect  on growth
For  the developing  countries, equation 7 indicates a  significantly  negative relationship
between  world intert  rates and growth  rates and significant  cointegration  statistics. Equation  8,
under the hypothesis  that the series are 1(2),  shows no dgnificant  relationship. For the U.S.,
equation  9 has a negative  but insignificant  coeficient on the interest  rate while  equation 10 under
the hypothesis  of 1(2)  series  is completely  insignificant.
3A.  Ib_caldy  1namic  MQdlg
An alternative  to the above  tests of cointegration  is the estimation  of a full dynamic  model.
Engle  and Granger  have  shown  that all cointegated  series  can be represented  by an error correction
process  and series  that follow  an error correction  model  can be said to be cointegrated.'l  Thus an
19 Englo  and  (ranger  (1987).25
alternative  test of the eristnce of a cointegrating  equilibrium  is to estimate  a dynamic  model  to see
if it is of an error correction  form such as:
AYy  = a1Ar, + a2 (Yt t - rtl)  + aAYt.1.
An unrestricted  dynamic  modeling  strategy  was  followed  whereby  the  most general  model  was
simplified  according  to  variable sigificance.  Four lag  of the independent  and dependent
variables  were included  for the quarterly  data on the 0-7 and the U.S. and the  re  teid
until the most parsimonius  chaazation  of the data generating  proces  was obtained.  The
unrestricted  estimates  are equation  9, 11 and 19  in table 9 and the resulting  ar  t  ins  in
equations 10, 12, and 202  Although  the interest rate (R) is sgnificant in equation 10, it has a
positive  sip.  Moreover,  the lagged  levd of the interest  rate (R(-l)) which  constitutes  part of the
error corroction  term is insignificant,  thereby indicating  that the relationship  is not of the error
correction  form. The reparameterization  in equation 12 has signficant and appropriately  sied
components  of the error correction  term (Y(-1)  and R(-1)),  but the interest  rate (R) is insignificant,
again  rejecting  the error correction  form. Similarly  in equation  20 for the United  States,  both R and
the lagged  level  R(-1) are insignificant.
20Se  S  endry  and  Richa  (1983)  for a dssion  of this  methodology.
21Tho  results  for the hypothesis  of I(2)  for the U.S.  are not reported  here  given  the  poor  performance
of equation  10  in table  8.26
TABLE  9:  ERCaR  CORRECTION  MODELS  OF  OUTPUT  GROUTH  AND  INTERESY  RATES
0-7  ECOONOIES  DEVELOPING  ECONOMIES  UNITED  STATES
(11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)
HO:lt1)  HO:1(2)  HO:1C1)  HO:I(2)  NO:101)
UOE REPARAN  WE  REPARAN  WE  REPARAN  UDE REPARAN  UE  REPARAN
...................................................................................................
C  0.70  0.77  0.00  -0.01  5.13  5.27  0.05  0.04  0.68  0.71
(2.59)  (3.51)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (2.61)  (2.93)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (4.28)  (5.87)
R  0.18  0.26  0.21  0.13  *0.12  -0.13  *0.21  -0.17  0.06  0.07
(2.11)  (3.40)  (2.26)  (1.49)  (0.71)  (0.80)  (1.10)  (0.94)  (0.62  (0.78)
DY(-1)  0.25  0.30  0.00  0.32  0.34  0.28  -0.07
(2.33)  (2.93)  (0.02)  (1.09)  (1.23)  (1.03)  (0.49)
DY(-2)  0.28  0.29  0.20  0.08
(2.44)  (2.57)  (1.33)  (0.67)
DYt(-3)  0.20  0.30  0.23  0.03
(1.60)  (2.20)  (2.34)  (0.26)
DYt(-4)  -0.14  0.06  0.04
(1.20)  (0.48)  (0.51)
DR(-I)  0.06  0.82  0.63  -0.04  0.27  0.25  -0.05
(0.66)  (3.69)  (3.75)  (0.23)  (1.49)  (1.39)  (0.55)
DR(-2)  -0.17  0.61  0.41  -0.26  -0.19
(1.75)  (3.16)  (3.48)  (2.49)  (2.09)
DR(-3)  -0.08  0.41  0.28  -0.06
1.02)  (3.06)  (3.30)  (0.57)
DRt-4)  -0.22  -0.18  0.15  -0.11
(2.72)  (2.41)  (1.58)  (1.10)
Yt-1)  -0.21  -0.23  -0.89  -0.75  -0.94  *0.96  -1.29  -1.01  -0.75  -0.77
(3.04)  (4.34)  (4.69)  (6.94)  (2.70)  (3.01)  (3.22)  (3.39)  (5.03)  (9.42)
Rt-1)  -0.02  -0.03  -0.60  -0.48  -0.21  -0.22  -0.54  -0.49  -0.04  -0.06
(0.59)  (0.92)  (2.24)  (2.00)  (1.78)  (2.11)  (1.87) (1.72)  (0.94) (1.56)
R  SQUARED  0.51  0.46  0.57  0.52  0.46  0.45  0.63  0.59  0.47  0.44
DW  2.11  2.21  1.86  2.20  1.92  1.86  1.98  1.78  2.00  2.06
F  5.18  7.84  6.44  8.48  1.54  1.99  2.56  2.84  8.47  19.19
FOR  HO0:lt1)*  THE  LEFT  HAND  SIDE  VARIABLE  IS THE  FIRST  DIFfERENCE  OF REAL  OUTPUT  CROUTH.
FOR  HO:02),  THE  LEFT  HAND  SIDE  VARIABLE  IS  THE  SECOND  DIFFERENCE  OF  REAL  OUTPUT  GROUTH.
THE  DIFFERENCED  RIGHT  HAND  SIDE  VARIABLES  ARE  ALSO  SECOND  DIFFERENCES.27
For the developing  countries,  one lag of the dependent  variable  and of the independent
variable  weo  included  of  the  annual  data  in  the  utited  equations  13  and 1S  to preseve  degres
of fedom.  The reparameterizations  in equations  14 and 16 reject  the error correcton  model
because  of the isigcance  of the interst rato  term. This  was  futhe  confirmed  by the use  of a
two  stag procedure  proposed  by Engle  and ranger for  esmting  error  correction  models?2
The results  in table 9 confirm  the findings  of th  earlier  cointegation  tests. The error
correcdon  model  was  not accepted  as an appropriate  representation  of  the  time  series,  thus  implying
that thr  is no clear long run equilibrium  between  real interest  rates and real growth  rates.
Although  wualy isinificant, the  interest  rate  term  (R)  was  always  positive  in the  industrial  country
equations  and was  always  negative  in the developing  country  regmesons.
For the  industial  countries  there  was  some  weak  evidence  of  a positive  relationship  between
inter  rates  and growth  in table  8 and 9, which  would  seem  to support  the view  that penods  of
rapid  growth  tend  to coincde  with  high  interest  rates  as a result  of  increased  investment  demand  in
response  to higher  profitability.  The  was  also  some  evidence  of a negative  relationship  between
developing  country  growth  and real interational  interest  rates  in equation  7 of table  8. This  may
be because  investment  by developing  countries,  partcularly  by the public  sector,  may be more
constrained  by international  borrowing  than  that in industrial  countries.  The  results  for  the United
States  are broadly  consistent  with those  for the 0-7, thereby  implying  that markets  are fairly
integrated  internationally.
E2gle  and  Granger  (1987)  and  Hall  (1986).28
3.5. £Qnwushs  km  Ecometric Analyiiz
The econometric  analysis  presented  here would  dispute  the existence  of consistent  negative
effects  on growth  resulting  from high  real interest  rates. Thus  periods  of high  real interest  rates  may
coincide  with  periods  of rapid growth  and vice  versa. The evidence  for the industrial  countries  partly
supports the view that high real interest rates may reflect periods of increased  profitability  or
improved  investment  efficiency,  even when  investment  rates decline. There may also be scope  for
greater externalities  from investment  in periods  of high real interest rates because  the opportunity
cost of investment  is high. For the low and middle  income  countries,  there is some,  albeit weak,
evidence  of a negative  relationship. This may reflect  their greater dependence  on international
borrowing  for investment  at the margin or the reduced  scope  for increased  returns to investment
because  of human capital and institutional  constraints. Whfle  periods of high interest rates may
coincide  with greater productivity  in the industrial  countries,  the developing  economies  have little
imnact  on the global  outcome  and must respond  to a given  external  environment. Therefore,  high
real interest rates will probably affect developing  countries  that are highly indebted  at variable
interest rates and those that need  to borrow  further adversely. In contrast,  developing  economies
that are outwardly-oriented  can profit from increased  exports as a result of rapid growth in the
industrial  countries. However,  the net effect  on the overall growth performanoe  of the low and
middle  income  countries  is ambiguous.29
4.  Prospects for the 1990s
A number of individuals and  institutions have warned of a  further tightening of credit
markets along with higher world interest rates in the 1990s.23  Longer term government bond yields
have already risen in a number of industrial countries. Greater demand as well as supply constaints
are blamed for putting further upward pressure on interest rates.
On the demand side, the costs of financing German reunification may both drive up German
interest rates and reduce the size of the current account surplus that has been available to finance
the needs of  deficit countries in  the past.24  This  will be  especially important  if  the German
government uses bonds to finance its projected budget deficit of 5% of GDP rather than raise taxes
which are perceived to have a more dampening effwt on growth."  The reconstucon  of Kuwait
and Iraq will exert new pressures on the supply of global savings.  A further source of increased
demand will be Eastern Europe, although the magnitude is likely to be relatively small in a global
context.  In addition, the recent negotiations over the 1991 U.S. deficit reduction package may have
undermined confidence  that future deficits will be successfully  lowered,  despite the Gramm-Rudman
23 The Bank for International  Settlements  warned  of the possibility  of an "international  credit crunch"
because  of large  budget  deficits,  tight monetary  policies,  rising  demand  for capital  from Eastern Europe  and
a slowdown  in lending  by Japanese  and American  banks. lih  EMnDi1,  October  20 1990,  p. 81.  Recent
acdons by the U.S. Federal  Reserve  to lower  reserve  requirements  for banks are aimed at avoiding  a credit
squeeze.
24  Estimates  are that approximately  DM40 billion  ($26  billion)  this year  and DM60  billion  for 1991  are
needed  to finance  the east German  budget  deficit,  meet social  secuity needs,  restructure  industries,  improve
infasttructure  and service  the foreign  debt.  Estimates  of the costs of unification  until 1993/4  range from
DM300-DM350  billion.  As for the current account surplus,  estimates  by five major economic  research
institutes  in Germany  are that it will  fall to only DM16 billion  next year, compared  to a current aocount
surplus  of DM104  billion  in 1989  for West  Germany  alone. Marsh  (1990).
25 Marsh  (1990).30
logisation. Thus fears  of future  monetztion of U.S.  deficits  may  raise  inflationary  expctaions and
drive  real interest  rates even  higher.
On the supply side, more restrictive  lending practices may result from microeconomic
problems  in the banking  sectors  of many of the major economies  in the wake  of ongoing  ldc debt
problems,  the saviW and loan  crisis  and the financial  instability  of several  major  commercial  banks.
Thus far, this has been  manifested  largely  in terms  of an increase  in the cost of funds  to higher  risk
borrowers,  particularly  in the United  States,  the United  Kingdom,  Australia  and Canada.6 Should
this become  more severe,  central banks may move to lower  nominal interest rates to reduce the
potential  recesionary effects.
What does the above  econometric  analysis  imply  for the consequences  of persistent  high,  or
possibly  even higher,  real interest  rates in the future? One implication  is that ultimately  hiugh  real
intst  rates may  not matter for growth  performance  if more productive  investment  results. Thus
it remains  to be seen  whether  investment  productivity  wil continue  to rise in the 1990s. If there is
a negative  impact  of higher  interest  rates on growth,  it wl  probably  affect  the developing  countries
more adversely. This is not simply  because  the low and middle  income  countries  are net debtors
since  the category includes  some capital exporters,  such as several  of the oil producers,  and the
industrial  country group includes  the largest debtor of all, the United  States. Rather, it seems  to
reflect  the differing  structural  characteristics  of industrial  and developing  economies.
26  Fidler,  Hargreaves  and London  (1990).31
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